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ABSTRACT

Optimism of the Intellect, Pessimism of the Will?
A Gramscian Analysis of Two New York Police Reform Campaigns
by
Christian Covington

Advisor: Benedetto Fontana
This paper attempts to analyze two recent New York police reform campaigns - one to
overturn the state’s system of criminal bail release, the other to make police officer discipline
transparent to the public - using theories given by Antonio Gramsci. The paper will apply the
concepts of hegemony, hegemonic discourse, the intertwining of the state and civil society, the
attainment of political agency amongst the subaltern, and the role ideology plays in all of these
concepts, to assess the success of the reform campaigns. The paper will argue that many of
these concepts are further developments of political theories first expounded by Machiavelli, in
order to support the notion that Gramscian theory is not strictly Marxist, but a distinctly
humanist approach to politics.
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I. Introduction

Earlier this year, the Vera Institute of Justice, a criminal justice think tank located in New
York City, quietly issued a report on the effect of changes made by the New York State
Legislature in 2019 to the state’s system of criminal bail release. “Bail” refers to the legal rules
establishing and regulating the conditions by which a person, after being arrested, is allowed to
post a sum of money, either in cash or some form of security (“cash bail”), so as to be released
from jail, pending either the completion of the criminal trial, or the final removal of the charges
against the person.1
The legislature, and others working to enact these changes into law, gave several
arguments in promoting this “bail reform,” but the initial ones were that: bail was a form of
economic discrimination, in that those who could afford bail were allowed to be released, while
those who could not languished in jail, although both persons may have been charged with the
same criminal offense;2 bail was a form of racial discrimination, because Blacks and Latinos
were overly represented in the group of persons who could not afford bail;3 and bail reversed
the principle of the presumption of innocence before trial, in that persons unable to post cash

1

New York Consolidated Laws Service (LexisNexis) N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law Articles 500 – 540 Procedures for
Securing Attendance at Criminal Actions and Proceedings of Defendants and Witnesses Under Control of Court –
Recognizance, Bail and Commitment (1971)
2
Emma Whitford, “Momentum Builds For Ending Cash Bail System That Punishes The Poor,” Gothamist, August 10,
2017 https://gothamist.com/news/momentum-builds-for-ending-cash-bail-system-that-punishes-the-poor; Errol
Louis, “A bold move against bad bail,” Daily News (New York), October 9, 2018; John Raphling and DeAnna Hoskins,
“The right kind of bail reform,” Daily News (New York), March 4, 2019 https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/nyoped-the-right-kind-of-bail-reform-20190301-story.html
3
Nick Pinto, “The Unraveling of Hard-Won Criminal Justice Reforms in New York,” The Intercept, February 23, 2020
https://theintercept.com/2020/02/23/criminal-justice-bail-reform-backlash-new-york/
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bail endured lengthy jail stays before trial, and in fact, were more likely than persons who could
afford bail to plead guilty to the criminal charges, in some instances, just to get out of jail.4
Consequently, the legislature, in the 2019 session, voted to make it impossible to
require that a person have to post cash bail in order to be released from jail after being
arrested for a criminal offense, excluding arrests for violent criminal offenses (e.g., assault) and
some other offenses.5 Although the bail reform campaign had sought a complete ban on the
use of cash bail, a compromise was made to exclude violent offenses from the bill in order to
secure passage of the legislation.6 Nevertheless, a study published by John Jay College of
Criminal Justice noted that the new law would apply to 91% of the persons arrested in New
York.7
Thus, it was perhaps discouraging to bail reform proponents when the Vera Institute
report issued this past February noted that: the racial disparity between Black and whites as to
arrestees being held in jail had actually increased since the bail law took effect on January 1,

4

Justine Olderman, Lisa Schreibersdorf, Tina Luongo, Stan German and Matt Knecht, “Real Criminal Justice Reform
Requires Standing Up to Fear-Mongering,” Gotham Gazette, January 1, 2020 https://www.gothamgazette.com
/opinion/9025-real-criminal-justice-reform-stand-up-fear-mongering; Michael Blake and Elizabeth Gaynes, “The
Social Value of Bail Reform,” Gotham Gazette, January 17, 2020 https://www.gothamgazette.com/opinion/9058the-social-value-of-bail-reform-more-to-do-criminal-justice
5
Michael Rempel and Krystal Rodriguez, Bail Reform in New York: Legislative Provisions and Implications for New
York City, Center for Court Innovation (April 2019)
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/document/2019/Bail_Reform_NY_full_0.pdf
6
Jeff Coltinis, “Cash bail still in judges’ tool belts after major reforms,” City & State, April 1, 2019
https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/policy/policy/new-york-bail-reform-changes.html
7
Richard Khavkine, “Hate Crimes and Other Occurrences Trigger Pushback on Bail Reforms,” Chief-Leader, January
3, 2020. The percentage stated applied to persons whose criminal case extended beyond the initial court
appearance, the criminal arraignment; that is, it applied to persons for whom if bail were required, would have to
be incarcerated in jail, if they could not post bail.
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2020; people held in jail were staying longer than before; and the total number of persons held
in jail prior to trial had hardly declined in New York State since the passage of bail reform.8
In June of 2020, the New York State Legislature voted to repeal Section 50-a of the
state’s Civil Rights Law, the section that prohibited police departments from releasing details
about a police officer’s disciplinary record to the public.9 Nevertheless, when the New York
Police Department (NYPD) finally released the information which it deemed as complying with
the state’s mandate, the release was met with something less than universal acclaim: “[this] is a
slap in the face to every New Yorker that took to the streets and the polls demanding an end to
the secrecy shrouding NYPD abuse,” noted one commentator;10 "this isn't transparency, it's a
PR tool for the NYPD,” noted another.11
These criticisms stemmed from the NYPD’s narrow interpretation of the legislature’s
repeal and of a Federal court’s decision confirming the repeal of Section 50-a. Whereas the
court’s decision allowed the NYPD to release all disciplinary decisions regarding an officer, the
department chose to release only those records that resulted in a finding of an admission of
guilt.12 As a para-military organization, however, discipline in the NYPD can be imposed by a
superior officer without a finding of guilt.13 Additionally, there are many discipline hearings that

8

Kay Dervishi, “Bail reform reduced jail populations, but racial disparities worsened,” City & State, February 18,
2021 https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/policy/criminal-justice/bail-reform-reduced-jail-populations-racialdisparities-worsened; Vera Institute of Justice, “Empire State of Incarceration,” February 18, 2021
https://www.vera.org/empire-state-of-incarceration-2021 (accessed April 6, 2021)
9
Denis Slattery, “Shining a new light on NYPD,” Daily News (New York) June 10, 2020
10
Ashley Southall, “NYPD Releases Secret Misconduct Records After Repeal of Shield Law,” New York Times, March
8, 2021 https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/08/nyregion/nypd-discipline-records.html
11
Jake Offenhartz, “New NYPD Database Offers “Narrow” Glimpse at Police Discipline Records,” Gothamist, March
9, 2021 https://gothamist.com/news/new-nypd-database-offers-narrow-glimpse-police-disciplinary-records
12
Southall, “NYPD Releases”; Uniformed Fire Officers Ass'n v. De Blasio, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 4266 (accessed
February 17, 2021 10:50 AM)
13
See, e.g., N.Y.P.D. Patrol Guide Section 206-02 “Schedule “A” and Schedule “B” Command Discipline” (which
empowers a superior to discipline officers without resorting to formal charges); N.Y.P.D. Patrol Guide Section 206-
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result in an officer accepting punishment without a finding of guilt (with the exact number of
such cases, of course, being unknown).14 Thus, the department’s decision to disclose only those
cases that resulted in a finding of admission of guilt served to exclude the vast majority of its
discipline cases. Moreover, the department’s data release also excluded: all pending discipline
cases; all discipline cases finalized before 2014; all discipline cases in which an officer was not
punished; and all discipline cases in which the officer accepted a lesser degree of punishment.15
It was clear that the department’s attempt at discipline transparency still left many matters in
the dark.
Both the legislature’s repeal of Section 50-a and its enactment of the bail reform were
the culmination of years-long campaigns (“reform campaigns”) conducted by coalitions of nongovernmental organizations seeking to make changes to New York’s criminal justice system.
And while it would be charitable to say that these reform campaigns were partially successful,
in my opinion, such a statement would not be honest or accurate. One campaign sought to
eliminate the use of cash bail; it did not. The other campaign sought to make all of police officer
disciplinary records transparent to the public; it did not. This paper is an attempt at an
explanation as to why these campaigns were not successful.
Before I embark on my explanation, however, I need to clarify the parameters of my
discussion. I have chosen to term my paper as an analysis of police reform campaigns although
cash bail is not exclusively a matter for the police, involving court officials, district attorneys and

07 “Cause for Suspension or Modified Assignment” (which permits suspension of an officer when a superior officer
considers such action necessary)
14
See, e.g., Graham Rayman, “NYPD detective docked vacation days in informant fiasco,” Daily News (New York),
February 11, 2021 https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/ny-detective-disciplined-coercedinformant-staten-island-20210212-cohjlgdzejerdixj6bkipgisny-story.html
15
Southall, “NYPD Releases”
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defense attorneys. Nevertheless, the primary arguments made against bail reform were made
from a police perspective, revolving around issues of increased crime, the release of arrested
persons making police officers’ jobs more difficult and bail reform in general signifying a
decreased lack of respect for law enforcement.16 Although district attorneys also argued against
bail reform,17 the issue in the general public’s mind remained one of crime and policing.18
Additionally, in analyzing the reform campaign for the repeal of Section 50-a, I have
restricted my discussion to the debate surrounding New York City and the NYPD. While Section
50-a was a state measure that applied to all of New York State’s police departments, I have
chosen to focus on the debate that targeted the NYPD for three reasons: the NYPD has the
largest police force in the state, by far, with the total number of officers for New York City being
more than all of the police officers in the rest of the state;19 the reform campaigns directed
most of their efforts to New York City and Section 50-a repeal was very much perceived as a

16

Editorial, “Justice and Safety for All,” Daily News (New York), March 28, 2019; Craig McCarthy, “NYPD Big Rips
Bail-Reform 'Free'-for-All,” New York Post, August 12, 2019; Rebecca Rosenberg, Carl Campanile and Tina Moore,
“NY, Get Ready for the Bad Ol' 'Daze',” New York Post, January 1, 2020 https://nypost.com/2019/12/31/why-newyork-criminals-are-celebrating-the-new-year/
17
Eric Gonzalez, Darcel Clark, Cyrus Vance, Anthony Scarpino, Madeline Singas and Timothy Sini, “Reforms Fraught
with Serious Risk,” Daily News (New York), March 27, 2019 https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-opedreforms-fraught-with-serious-risk-20190327-nmezjrqncnatlgnopev4wuoc2q-story.html; John Ryan, “Bail Out of
This Botched Reform,” Daily News (New York), June 17, 2019
18
Ashley Southall and Jesse McKinley, “Spike in Crime Inflames Debate Over Bail Law in New York,” New York
Times, February 4, 2020 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/04/nyregion/crime-stats-nyc-bail-reform.html;
Associated Press, “Siena Poll: Declining Support for New York’s Bail Changes,” January 21, 2020
https://apnews.com/article/b7b920b62e3660ef0a602aefa427ef64
19
Brian A. Reaves, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies 2008, July 2011
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf (New York City 36,023; remainder of New York State 30,449)
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local issue;20 and the NYPD was the party in the repeal debate that was most successful in
steering the Section 50-a legislation to its favor.21
The NYPD’s success was a political one, and I intend to show how the political contest
was engaged in between the reform campaign and its opponents, what constituted the field of
contest, how the contest was fought and what factors contributed to victory and defeat. Many
reasons can be given for the campaigns lack of success, but the primary reason, in my opinion,
is they lacked an accurate conception of themselves and of the mass of people for whom they
claimed to be speaking, and of how both related to political power, with this misconception
creating an inaccurate assessment of their opponents and of how power is constituted.
I have adopted a Gramscian analytic, rooted in Machiavellian political theory, to engage
with the subject matter. Gramsci’s thought is an appropriate basis for analyzing these
campaigns because his thinking is based in historicism, that is, in an assessment of human
activity becoming conscious of itself, and of the manner in which the organized will of humans’
structures knowledge. Specifically, I am asserting five reasons why the campaigns were not
successful, all stemming from their initial misconception. First, they never understood their task
as obtaining power for the mass of citizens who lacked it in regard to the police. Second, this
lack of understanding led to a failure to develop the mass of people who could develop this
20

Kenneth Lovett, “Fighting NYPD Shield: Kin of 16 Slain by Cops Want Open-Records Law,” Daily News (New York),
December 24, 2018 https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ny-pol-50a-police-discipline-diallo-bell-garnercarr-20181223-story.html; Richard Khavkine, “At CCRB Meeting, Calls for Repeal of Law Shielding Cops' Records,”
Chief-Leader, November 15, 2019 https://thechiefleader.com/news/news_of_the_week/at-ccrb-meeting-calls-forrepeal-of-law-shielding-cops-records/article_dc31790e-07bd-11ea-aa6b-87bcf2d45755.html; Richard Khavkine,
“Williams Among Those Out for Repeal of Law Shielding Cop Records,” Chief-Leader, March 25, 2019
https://thechiefleader.com/news/news_of_the_week/williams-among-those-out-for-repeal-of-law-shielding-coprecords/article_fcd59886-4cb8-11e9-8944-f759ab64c640.html
21
New York State Senate Public Hearing: Policing (S3695), repeals provisions relating to personnel records of police
officers, firefighters, and correctional officers https://www.nysenate.gov/calendar/public-hearings/october-242019/public-hearing-policing-s3695-repeals-provisions-relating (accessed April 21, 2021 6:29 PM)
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new relationship to the police. Third, this failure was mainly due to the leaders of the
campaigns not engaging in a dialectical relationship with the people for whom they claimed to
be speaking. This lack of engagement led to the fourth reason, that the reform campaigns never
created an adequate ideological basis for their arguments. Fifth, the campaigns inaccurately
assessed the state as being the legislature, without accommodating the role of police
departments, district attorneys in dominating civil society discourse and thus, dominating the
discourse around their two campaigns. Finally, I conclude that all these failures, instead of
advancing the cause of police reform, only served to hinder it even more.

7

II. Two Police Reform Campaigns

In the fall of 2010, The Atlantic Philanthropies and the Open Society Foundations
convened a number of non-governmental organizations engaged in promoting fair and just
policing in New York City. Subsequent to this convening, a planning committee of nine
organizations convened three additional meetings in the summer of 2011 to eventually form
Communities United for
Police Reform (“CPR”).22 Over the next several years, CPR engaged in several police reform
campaigns, mainly directed at urging the New York City Council to adopt legislation enhancing
the accountability of officers of the NYPD.23 CPR currently is made up of 31 core members who
participate actively in the work of the coalition.24
In the fall of 2011, the New York Civil Liberties Union (“NYCLU”) filed a lawsuit to compel
the NYPD to release redacted records of final opinions issued since 2001 of police officer
disciplinary cases investigated by the New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board.25 A
lawsuit was deemed necessary to compel production of these records because under Section

22

Tides Foundation/The Advocacy Fund, Funds for Fair and Just Policing: Request for Letters of Inquiry December
2011
23
“Community Safety Act” campaign (creating an Inspector General’s office for the NYPD, amongst other
measures, took effect January 2014) https://www.changethenypd.org/community-safety-act (accessed April 22,
2021 2:15 PM); “Right to Know Act” campaign (requiring NYPD officers to identify themselves, amongst other
measures, took effect October 2018) https://www.changethenypd.org/RightToKnowAct (accessed April 22, 2021
2:12 PM)
24
Communities United for Police Reform, “Members” https://www.changethenypd.org/campaign/intro-members
(accessed April 22, 2021 2:21 PM)
25
Tom Robbins, “How a Coalition of New York Activists Revealed Police-Department Secrets,” The New Yorker, July
17, 2020 https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-local-correspondents/how-a-coalition-of-new-york-activistsrevealed-police-department-secrets; NYCLU is also a member of CPR. The New York City Civilian Complaint Board
investigates and adjudicates a subsection of discipline complaints made against police officers which involve officer
interactions with members of the public. https://www1.nyc.gov/site/mckinley/about/about.page (accessed April
22, 2021 2:43 PM)
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50-a of New York State’s Civil Rights Law, discipline decisions were considered part of a police
officer’s personnel record, and Section 50-a required that this record be kept confidential.26
The NYCLU lawsuit took several years to finally adjudicate, but while it was still wending
its way through the court system, in late July 2014, NYPD officer Daniel Pantaleo, in an attempt
to arrest Eric Garner, placed his arm around Garner’s neck in order to subdue him. Garner
eventually collapsed and died, with the entire interaction being captured on video.27 When on
December 2 of that year, a grand jury declined to indict officer Pantaleo for any criminal
wrongdoing,28 protests broke out, lasting several weeks, with protesters seeking to disrupt
traffic along New York’s bridges, tunnels, roadways and train terminals.29
The relevance of Garner’s death to the issue of Section 50-a and police discipline was
not immediate; however, almost two years after Garner’s death, in April 2016, published
accounts noted that officer Pantaleo had been investigated for a disciplinary infraction more
than two years before Garner’s death, with the final decision coming three years later, and with
the fact of this decision just then being released to the public.30 For years, the NYPD had

26

Richard Khavkine, “NYPD Wins in Court on Cop Discipline Records,” Chief-Leader, December 17, 2018
https://thechiefleader.com/news/news_of_the_week/nypd-wins-in-court-on-cop-discipline-records
/article_92851562-ffd1-11e8-ba69-1f3a0e02ee43.html; New York State Assembly Bill No. A02513
(https://nyassembly.gov/leg/?default_fld=&leg_video=&bn=A02513&term=2019 &Summary=Y&Actions=Y)
27
Editorial, “A death to investigate,” Daily News (New York), July 19, 2014
28
J. David Goodman and Al Baker, “Wave of Protests After Grand Jury Doesn’t Indict Officer in Eric Garner
Chokehold Case,” New York Times, December 3, 2014 https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/nyregion/grandjury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in-staten-island-chokehold-death-of-eric-garner.html
29
Jason Molinet, “Eric Garner grand jury decision sparks protests which shut down West Side Highway, Brooklyn
Bridge and Lincoln Tunnel,” Daily News (New York), December 3, 2014 https://www.nydailynews.com/newyork/protests-grand-jury-fails-indict-nypd-article-1.2032546; J. David Goodman, “Amid Assaults on Officers, New
York Police Rethink Their Response to Protests,” New York Times, December 14, 2014
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/15/nyregion/police-arrest-man-on-assault-charge-during-protest-onbrooklyn-bridge.html
30
Ryan Sit, “Cop Suspected in Eric Garner's Death Disciplined by NYPD,” Daily News (New York), April 4, 2016
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released limited information regarding disciplinary decisions to the media.31 But the dilatory
release of the limited discipline information regarding officer Pantaleo seemed to suggest a
departmental attempt to hide news about an unpopular subject. This attempt, along with the
anger over Garner’s death, and the fact that the discipline case over Garner’s death had not yet
occurred,32 all became of one-piece, conflating into a general unhappiness with the state of
NYPD discipline and its lack of transparency.
This general unhappiness was compounded when, in response to a lawsuit filed to
obtain additional information regarding officer Pantaleo’s discipline record, the NYPD stopped
releasing even the limited amount of discipline information it had customarily released since
the passage of Section 50-a into law in the 1970’s.33 Soon, judges, lawyers groups and editorial
boards were joining the criminal justice activists and attorneys in clamoring for greater
transparency as to NYPD discipline decisions.34 When, however, in December 2018, the
appellate court denied the NYCLU’s lawsuit seeking even redacted NYPD discipline records, it
seemed as if no change was imminent.35

31

Rocco Parascandola and Graham Rayman, “NYPD won't share actions against disciplined cops,” Daily News (New
York), August 24, 2016
32
In fact, the discipline case would not be heard until 2019. Ashley Southall, “‘I Can’t Breathe’: 5 Years After Eric
Garner’s Death, an Officer Faces Trial,” New York Times, May 12, 2019 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/12
/nyregion/eric-garner-death-daniel-pantaleo-chokehold.html; Ashley Southall, Ali Watkins and William K.
Rashbaum, “Daniel Pantaleo, N.Y.P.D. Officer in Eric Garner’s Death, Should Be Fired, Judge Says,” New York Times,
August 2, 2019 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/02/nyregion/eric-garner-daniel-pantaleo.html
33
Rick Rojas, “New York Police Dept., Citing Law, Stops Sharing Personnel Data,” New York Times, August 24, 2016
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/26/nyregion/new-york-police-dept-citing-law-stops-sharing-personneldata.html?ref=todayspaper
34
Ashley Southall, “4 Years After Eric Garner’s Death, Secrecy Law on Police Discipline Remains Unchanged,” New
York Times, June 3, 2018 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/03/nyregion/police-discipline-records-garner.html;
Editorial, “NYPD in view,” Daily News (New York), December 17, 2018; Mark Toor, “PBA Criticizes Call for Repeal of
Secrecy Law,” Chief-Leader, May 7, 2018 https://nycpba.org/news-items/chief/2018/pba-criticizes-call-for-repealof-secrecy-law/
35
Graham Rayman, “Can’t air cops’ records: court,” Daily News (New York), December 12, 2018
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Nevertheless, the steady drumbeat of criticism prompted both Mayor Bill DeBlasio and
then-Commissioner James O’Neal to respond in some fashion.36 In June 2018, O’Neal appointed
a panel to assess the NYPD’s system of discipline, including its lack of transparency.37 In early
February 2019, O’Neal responded to the panel’s report by basically stating the department’s
position on discipline transparency would revert to the status quo ante: “We need to put out
names, charges, documents and outcomes,” he declared.38
O’Neal’s declaration came less than two weeks after a bill had been filed in the New
York State Assembly completely repealing Section 50-a,39 and six months after CPR had made
its first appeal for the repeal of Section 50-a.40 CPR had previously worked on the “Community
Safety Act” and the “Right to Know Act;” it would term its work on the repeal of Section 50-a,
the “Safer NY Act.” Coincidentally, the day preceding the filing of the Section 50-a bill, a bill to
eliminate cash bail was filed in the New York State Senate.41
This was not the first bill to have been filed to eliminate cash bill, with bills having been
filed the previous two sessions. Both bills were accompanied by declarations from New York

36

Jillian Jorgensen, “No record of de Blasio’s cop disciplinary talks: Gov. Cuomo aide,” Daily News (New York),
March 17, 2018; Editorial, “The light blue wall of silence: The NYPD gets semi-transparent,” Daily News (New York),
March 30, 2018 https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/light-blue-wall-silence-nypd-semi-transparent-article1.3904360
37
Rocco Parascandola, “3 ex-fed bigs on panel to review NYPD discipline,” Daily News (New York), June 22, 2018
38
Ali Watkins and Ali Watson, “After Critical Report, Police Commissioner Pushes for More Sunlight on Disciplinary
Files,” New York Times, February 2, 2019
39
New York State Assembly Bill No. A02513
40
Communities United for Police Reform, “Press Release,” https://www.changethenypd.org/releases/statelegislators-advocates-call-repeal-new-york%E2%80%99s-police-secrecy-law-among-worst-nation (accessed April
22, 2021 5:11 PM)
41
New York State Senate Bill No. S2101A (https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/s2101)
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Governor Andrew Cuomo that criminal justice reform was needed, such declarations perhaps
being significant only for their lack of success.42
Nevertheless, there was an air of expectation about the latest filing: the most recent
state Senate elections had returned a Democratic majority for only the third time in the last 50
years,43 and along with the Democratic Governor Cuomo and a Democratic Assembly (which
had long had a Democratic majority), it was expected that progressive legislation, including
criminal justice reform, could be enacted into law with the help of this “Blue Wave.”44
Adding to this air of expectation was the appearance of a criminal justice reform group
that had made the elimination of bail its primary mission. New Yorkers United for Justice
(“NYUJ”) was a well-funded (supported by several billionaires)45 coalition of thirteen national
and New York City-based organizations that proposed a new approach to bail reform: “If you
talk about [elimination of cash bail] like it’s a social-justice issue, [people won’t understand],”
noted one member of the coalition. "But if you talk about it… like this is going to save money. ...
I think that they'll start to sort of understand where you're coming from."46 NYUJ was not a
member driven organization; rather it was formed with the specific intent of providing a

42

Erin Durkin, “Reform this now! Gov pushes overhaul of the justice system,” Daily News (New York), January 16,
2017; Shayna Jacobs and Reuven Blau, “Bail goes bye: Cy,” Daily News (New York), January 10, 2018
43
Rebecca C. Lewis, “The Blue Wave that Swamped the State Senate Republicans,” City & State, November 7, 2018
https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/politics/campaigns-elections/democrats-won-majority-in-new-yorkstate-senate.html
44
Kenneth Lovett, “Do your Dem job,” Daily News (New York), November 14, 2018
45
Lorenzo Jones and Charles Sayegh, “Grassroots Movements are Needed to End Mass Incarceration,” City Limits,
December 13, 2019 https://citylimits.org/2019/12/13/opinion-grassroots-movements-are-needed-to-end-massincarceration/
46
Matthew Chayes, “Crime Law Pitch: 'Save Money,' not 'Social Justice',” Newsday, March 2, 2019
https://www.newsday.com/long-island/nassau/criminal-justice-reform-ny-conservatives-1.27987754
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platform to unite the political left and right by lobbying legislators and conducting media buys
to educate the public and elected officials on the value of bail reform.47
Although other criminal justice advocates and lawyers’ groups advocated for bail
reform,48 NYUJ dominated the arguments for the elimination of cash bail. To the stance that
bail reform was an issue of racial, economic and procedural justice, NYUJ added the argument
that the requirement for cash bail was a waste of money. For instance, they argued:
•

Most persons required to post bail stay in jail for only two days,49 but even a two
day stay is likely to cost a person their job, access to public housing, student
loans, or childcare, etc.50

•

The cost of jailing a person before trial is almost $1,000 per day,51 while only 4%
of persons not jailed before trial fail to appear in court before their trial

These economic arguments tied into the other arguments for bail reform, for instance
that:
•

Requiring cash bail was a criminalization of poverty, because wealthier persons
could raise bail for similar offenses while an indigent person could not52
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•

Requiring cash bail is racially discriminatory, as the requirement mainly effected
Black and Latino persons who have been arrested53

•

Requiring cash bail reversed the presumption of a person’s innocence before
trial and operated as a form of pre-trial punishment54

•

And this form of pre-trial punishment led to innocent people being jailed for
years because they were unable to post a cash bond55 or to people pleading
guilty to criminal charges as the only means to get out of jail56

These arguments were countered by those of New York state’s police departments,
police unions and district attorneys.57 Their arguments centered wholly upon the fear of crime
and the use of bail as a deterrence to criminal activity. This counter-argument did not engage,
with the economic issue of the cost of cash bail to government or to society, except to argue
that cash bail was not a penalty for being poor, but rather was a penalty for criminal activity.58
Some of the arguments given by police and district attorneys were that:
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•

Not jailing defendants before trial would be dangerous to the public59 and that
persons released before trial would commit other crimes while awaiting trial,60
with officials providing examples of heinous crimes committed, that they linked
to bail reform, regardless of the inaccuracy of this linkage61

•

More crime would be committed without the threat of being jailed for an
offense, i.e., unless bail were used to jail a person before trial62 and that to argue
otherwise was to discount the superior knowledge police officials and district
attorneys had of the criminal justice system63

Thus, proponents and opponents of bail reform engaged in arguments that mostly did
not engage the other side’s argument. Both sides did, however, use similar strategies to win
their argument: lobbying legislators, press conferences and utilizing both paid and unpaid
media (editorials and op-eds). Although proponents of bail reform were able to place op-eds
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consistently in New York’s print media, the editorial boards were almost uniformly opposed to
eliminating cash bail.64
Consequently, even though bail reform was eventually enacted into law in April 2019, it
was not the full elimination that the reform campaigns sought, but a compromise version which
excluded from the restriction on imposing cash bail any criminal offense involving violence, as
well as some other non-violent offenses.65 And what was perhaps worse than the compromise,
police officials, unions, district attorneys and editorial boards continued to rail against the
recently enacted bail law, so much so, that the legislature began to consider “reform to the
reform” even before the new law took effect on January 1, 2020.66
Thus, while reform campaign advocates for the repeal of Section 50-a argued that the
bail legislation provided momentum for their own cause,67 a state legislator quietly mentioned
that repeal would be impossible in the current anti-police reform political climate.68 This lack of
initiative was confirmed in October 2019 by the state Senator who controlled the passage of
any repeal of Section 50-a, who flatly declared that repeal would not happen in the next
legislative session (2020) and might not happen for several years.69
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The Senator’s statement came days before an NYPD official testified before the
Senator’s committee, urging not a repeal of Section 50-a, but a “reform” along the lines
outlined earlier in the year by Commissioner O’Neal – making public some police officer
disciplinary information (name of officer, charges accused of, penalty assessed) only in regard
to serious instances of misconduct and only after a final disciplinary outcome had been
reached.70
As the legislative session opened in January, published reports noted that a New York
City program, created to ensure persons released before trial would appear for their scheduled
court appearance, was months away from being ready. Therefore, the 2020 state legislative
session began with a lack of initiative in terms of repeal of Section 50-a and the bail law and
with an attempt to roll back the reform achieved in the previous session.
NYUJ tried to restore the momentum for reform with a $2 million media buy for a public
education campaign.71 But the attempted roll back became manifest when, in late February,
Governor Cuomo announced he would not approve a state budget unless new restrictions were
added to the bail law.72 When the “reform to the reform” bill did pass the legislature (adding
more non-violent offenses to the list of those requiring bail),73 it was generally conceded that
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all hope for any major criminal justice reform in 2020 was lost,74 despite the fact that a bill
seeking to repeal Section 50-a had been filed in the state Senate.75
All of this changed when George Floyd was choked to death by a Minneapolis police
officer on May 25.76 Protests of the death began in New York City the following day,77 and four
days later Governor Cuomo announced his newfound support for repealing Section 50-a.78
After looting started in the city and a curfew was imposed,79 the Governor reiterated his
support: “We are also outraged [about the death of George Floyd] and we are going to do
something about it, and if 50-a is all we can do as a state, we’re going to do 50-a.”80
Thus, it was that what had taken almost ten years of activity, what had seemed hopeless
only a few months before, came to be: the repeal of Section 50-a. A new version of the repeal
bill was filed on June 6,81 and within a week the bill had passed both houses82 and been signed
by the Governor,83 completely smashing expectations as to what was and what was not
possible in the state legislature.
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Nevertheless, the sudden rush to victory had caught the reform campaign for repeal of
Section 50-a on the hop; they had not engaged in the legislative detail of the repeal bill and in
fact, in the heady days after passage of the bill, proceeded on a victory lap.84 But the language
of the bill was not so clear-cut; while Section 50-a was indeed repealed, the bill had installed a
new system by which disciplinary records were to be revealed to the public and the intent of
this new system was neither obvious nor clear.
Almost immediately after the bill’s passage, New York City’s police unions filed suit to
stop the release of any discipline information, and a state court barred the release of any
information that had not been the subject of a final disciplinary hearing.85 Soon thereafter, the
NYPD announced it would not release any police officer discipline information to the public,
pending a final decision on the repeal of Section 50-a by a Federal appeals court.86 This
dilemma could have been foreseen by the manner in which the debate on the repeal of Section
50-a was conducted. When the reform campaign argued for transparency, the NYPD consented
to this argument, but wanted to set the terms of what transparency meant.
Once again, as with the bail reform campaign, the different sides of the debate mostly
talked past each other. The reform campaign argued that:
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•

Transparent discipline was needed to ensure a fair discipline system87 and would
increase the public’s confidence in the NYPD88 and increase trust in individual
officers89

•

The public had a right to know how government officials performed their tasks,
especially with regard to police officers,90 and especially for persons who had
been subject to officer misconduct but were unable to discover whether the
officer had been disciplined91

The NYPD and its unions, on the other hand, argued that discipline transparency would
lead to harm against individual officers92 and would destroy the public’s confidence in the
police.93 The NYPD agreed with the reform campaign that transparency could lead to an
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increase in trust in individual officers,94 but only if this transparency was on its own terms:
discipline should be made transparent to the public only in cases of serious misconduct.95
Both the reform campaigns proponents and opponents relied on the same tactics to
achieve their results: lobbying state legislators, holding press conferences and utilizing paid and
unpaid media. CPR, as a member-driven organization, also organized rallies of their coalition
members, usually at the steps of the legislature. The city’s print media was overwhelmingly in
favor of repealing Section 50-a, but was willing to concede that the terms of the replacement
needed to be worked out by the NYPD,96 which was exactly what the department did.
The language of the bill repealing Section 50-a tracked exactly what the NYPD testified
to in the October 2019 state Senate hearing. The new law allowed police discipline
transparency only in cases of serious instances of misconduct and only after a final disciplinary
outcome had been reached.97 And while the reform campaigns cried foul,98 that “repeal meant
repeal,” it was clear that the new law was not the blanket removal of all restrictions on
releasing officer discipline information that they had desired.
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Thus, when the Federal appeals court rendered its decision on the Section 50-a repeal
bill this February, it confirmed that the bill applied only to serious misconduct and that the bill
allowed the NYPD to release information not subject to a final disciplinary outcome (that is, the
NYPD was permitted to release results of discipline investigations or records of discipline that
had been handed down outside of an NYPD internal hearing).99 Consequently, the NYPD,
consistent with its intention all along, chose not to take advantage of the latitude granted by
the court, and released only that discipline information that had been subject to a final
determination.100
Such a conclusion to the repeal of Section 50-a campaign should have been anticipated.
As with the bail reform campaign, reform proponents failed to engage in political tactics
suitable to achieve their strategic goals. I maintain these failures on a tactical level were due to
the inadequate political epistemology of the reform campaigns. It now becomes incumbent for
me to explain what I think an adequate epistemology looks like and why I think it would have
made a difference to the success of these campaigns.
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III. Gramsci’s Machiavellian Roots

To understand the roots of Gramsci’s political involvement one needs to know that his
involvement starts from an attempt to resolve Italy’s “Southern Question.”101 He was most
concerned of how to address the political marginalization and economic and cultural
backwardness of the Southern half of Italy, and in particular, the peasantry of Southern Italy.102
Gramsci noted that the process of risorgimento, or the creation of the modern Italian national
state, had not involved incorporating the Southern peasantry into the political process.103
The risorgimento had in fact created not a state with a coherent national philosophy, but rather
had merely extended the rule of the Piedmontese monarchy over the entire territory, thus
maintaining the distinctly different regional political ethos of Italy.
One element of this ethos was a dominant belief that the backwardness of Southern
Italy stemmed from the innate characteristics of Southern Italians, in their lack of initiative and
disinterest in participating in a modern economy.104 Gramsci rejected this notion, asserting that
the Southern Question was one that was historically determined by specific economic and
political causes.105 Gramsci’s response to the material condition of the Southern peasantry was
a political one, that Italy needed to formulate a new national political ethos, one that included
the southern peasantry.
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As a socialist, Gramsci acknowledged the urban proletariat as the leading class for
bringing about this new society, but insisted that this change could not happen without the
proletariat establishing a class alliance with the Southern peasantry.106 This alliance, in turn,
could not happen unless the proletariat understood the class demands of the peasantry. 107
The Southern peasants, therefore, needed to be able to clearly articulate what were their
demands. The peasants, however, were disaggregated and fragmented; they lacked a distinct
set of economic or political demands108
Gramsci asserted that this failure to establish distinct class based demands stemmed
from the manner in which the peasantry understood their interests. Gramsci felt their
understanding had been formed by the intellectual class of Southern Italy, a class which was
beholden to the landowner class and which therefore transmitted a cultural and political
outlook to the peasantry that favored the interests of the landowner.109 This inability of the
peasantry to articulate their own interests diminished the possibility of their forming a class
alliance with the proletariat.
This epistemological approach to a political problem encompassed all of Gramsci’s
political concerns regarding the Italian state: recognizing an historically determined political
actor; ascertaining the factors contributing to the actor’s failure to assert themselves politically;
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the actor developing the mindset that allowed him to clarify what were his class interests; the
actor using these class interests to establish cross-class alliances; and subsequently, using these
cross-class alliances to create a new Italian national political ethos.
It was this approach, and these questions, that Gramsci sought to resolve in the
immediate post-war period in Italy. In this period, Gramsci was responding specifically to three
events: the failure of the Turinese worker strikes and the dissolution of the workers’ councils
that were supposed to initiate a proletariat revolution; the rise of fascism in Italy; and the
change in Communist political doctrine that began to recognize that a proletarian revolution in
Western Europe would not happen along the same lines as that in Russia.110
Gramsci pursued a philosophical, historical and cultural response to this political
problem. The socialist movement had been unable to overthrow bourgeois society while
working within that society and utilizing its institutions.111 This was due to what Gramsci
perceived as the movement being generally defensive in confronting capitalism, while offering
declamatory and utopian appeals for mass action; the aftermath of defeat spurred him to
reassess the bases for political action along the lines mentioned above.112
The questions Gramsci raised about the political process, and the solutions at which he
arrived, owed much to his study of the thought of Machiavelli. Machiavelli’s thought was
rooted in a time of societal upheaval, similar to Gramsci’s: different types of rule (republican
versus dynastic), economic bases (feudal landed interests versus urban elites) and political
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structures (oligarchic versus popular) were all unsettled and in flux.113 Machiavelli sought to
devise a more stable basis for a ruler’s political legitimacy, one that didn’t rely on the hereditary
principle, and could survive when there was no basis for dynastic continuity.114 In the end, his
search, as with Gramsci’s, led Machiavelli to develop a philosophical, historical and cultural
response to a political problem.
In developing this response, Machiavelli introduced two novel elements to the
understanding of political power: the role of the “mass,” or the people, in securing legitimacy
and the creation of a science of political statecraft, unmoored from any larger ethical or moral
order.115 Machiavelli was the first thinker to note that the relationship between a ruler, who
desires a more stable political order, and the “mass” has a dual nature, as both subject and
object. The people serve as the subjects who support a ruler’s political legitimacy while at the
same time serving as the object of the ruler’s efforts to create this new, more stable political
order.
Machiavelli recognized the dual nature of state power, that the force embodied in state
power also had to incorporate the consent of the people in order to be truly effective. In such a
dynamic, it was incumbent upon a ruler to create the subjects who would be responsive to the
new order - a ruler needed to develop the understanding of the people so they would create
the legitimacy needed to secure the new political order.
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This idea supports Gramsci’s criticism of Italian political practice being based on a
political elite that did not seek the approval of the mass of the people and did not rely on them
for support. Gramsci felt, as Machiavelli did in his time, that the weakness of the Italian (or
Florentine, for Machiavelli) state was due to this lack of popular support. Such weakness, he
felt, was complicit in the state’s succumbing to fascism after World War I.116
This was why Gramsci raised the specter of the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce,
who theorized that political knowledge had to distinguish between the ruler and the ruled.
Gramsci viewed Croce as an “anti-Machiavellian” because Croce felt that political power had to
be preserved within an elite in order to coerce and contain the nature of the mass of people, as
opposed to relying on the mass of the people.117
Nevertheless, Gramsci felt that Croce, in his attempt to exclude the masses from power,
by trying to deny them a role in politics and history, revealed that the power of the masses
could no longer be denied.118 Similarly, Gramsci viewed Croce’s call for an intellectual elite
separate from the values and thought of the established power structure, an important
development in how the political education of the masses could take place.119 This intellectual
elite, according to Gramsci, could provide Italy with, not just new rulers, but a new type of
political education for a new type of rule
But basing political rule on the mass of people raised two questions: how is this popular
support generated and what does this support consist of? Machiavelli’s basing political
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legitimacy on the support of the people introduced the mass of the people into history – the
people were no longer objects of historical action, but had a role to play. This recognition of the
people as historical actors required a ruler to uncover and make plain their reality, to show
people the relevant facts of their existence, so they could understand their role as actors.120
Once it was established what the facts of reality were, it was also possible to see how
reality should be structured; by establishing a distinction between “what is,” or current reality,
and “what ought to be,” an envisioned future, the ruler provides for the content of popular
support.121 It is this transformative content that creates the basis for popular support.
Additionally, this insertion of people into history alters their consciousness – history is
not just something received, but is something created. Between the “what is” and “what ought
to be,” or between the problem and the solution, lies a man who is an historical product,
creating a solution which transcends the facts from which the problem arose.122 Thus, the
people become part of the solution, not as followers of a leader, but as creators of a new
reality. For Machiavelli, in order to create a new history, one had to locate oneself in relation to
that history – one had to assimilate it, make it one’s own, in order to overcome it and create a
new political order.123
Gramsci noted that such a process “historicizes thought,” that this historicization reveals
how certain conceptions of the world have created the world, and allows one to understand
how these conceptions established the basis for concrete action in the world.124 Such a process

120

Fontana, Hegemony, 76
Fontana, Hegemony, 79
122
A. B. Davidson, “Gramsci and Reading Machiavelli,” Science & Society, 37 no. 1 (Spring, 1973), 62
123
Davidson, “Gramsci,” 66; Fontana, Hegemony, 83
124
Fontana, Hegemony, 108
121

28

was important for two reasons: first, it shows “that reality does not exist on its own, in and for
itself, but rather in a historical relationship with the men who modify it.” Second, this
intellectual understanding of history has a political effect – this new conception of the world,
generated by the new understanding of history, has meaning only when entered into reality;
that is, the activity stemming from this new conception of the world, the placing of this new
conception into material reality, is political activity.125
Machiavelli’s idea that reality was something that man creates is crucial in
understanding how he came to develop his second aspect of political power, that of political
statecraft unmoored from any permanent ethical order. For Machiavelli, if man creates reality,
political action takes place in a world without a permanent basis for action, without the
“underlying norm of reality to which men could adjust or from which they could draw firm rules
of conduct.”126
Without this underlying norm of reality, the political actor always performs in a world in
a state of flux, in which the only constant was movement and change.127 Just as important, a
political actor needs to be able to distinguish between reality, illusion and effective reality, that
is, between what is real, what is false, and what is the reality the actor wishes to create in order
to reach the ends he desires.128
Such an ability implies a certain form of knowledge that cannot be embodied in firm
rules of conduct. Rather, Machiavelli sought to provide a set of precepts that could only be
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assessed in relation to the specific circumstances the political actor encountered. Not simply a
case of determining a problem and solution, Machiavelli offers a new political theory, one in
which the problem and solution exist in a dynamic relationship with the actor who is creating
the solution and the subject who is receiving it. The problem, solution, actor and subject are all
interacting with each other to determine the adequacy of the response to the political issue129
Machiavelli deemed this ability to develop an adequate response to a political issue as a
skill, which he called virtu. Virtu necessitated the ability to assess the objective conditions of the
political issue to be decided,130 while presupposing a recognition that the issue has to be dealt
with in the political realm; that is, virtu requires that an actor perceive himself as an historical
actor, one that has an ability to effect change131
This ability to effect change, combined with the realization that an actor can effect
change, Machiavelli terms fortuna, which, for Machiavelli, most appropriately exists in support
of the creation of the new form of political legitimacy that relies on the mass of people.
Thus, virtu is not simply a skill to be developed for political purposes, but has a content that
seeks to guide fortuna so as to legitimate popular political control. Therefore, virtu, as defined
by Machiavelli, carries with it the dual nature mirroring the relationship between the ruler and
the “mass” – actions carried out according to virtu seek to create a new political and ethical
order in which the “mass” begins to embody the new order which virtu encapsulates.132
Similarly, actions carried out according to virtu promote recognition amongst the “mass” of its
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ability to effect change; the nature of fortuna has changed from events that simply happen, to
events that are shaped by the people acting for themselves133
Thus, it becomes clear that what Machiavelli envisioned in a new political order is not
simply an order in which a ruler develops willing subjects, but one in which the people are led
to create the new political space in which a ruler operates. Consequently, the ruler is
transformed into a representative of the people, and as such, legitimizes his rule with the
people.134 Such a transformation, however, is only possible through the prior establishment of a
structure of discourse that allows the people to respond to and converse with the ruler who is
seeking to create this new order.135
Machiavelli’s political theory served to ground Gramsci’s search for answers as to how
to develop a new political ethos based on the mass, how to create historical and political
agency, how to develop a relationship between the ruler and the mass, what was the political
knowledge needed for this relationship, and the role of ideology to bring all these pieces
together. All of these matters Gramsci sought to apply to the specific situation of a modern
Western nation, such as post-World War I Italy.
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IV. Gramsci’s Political Theory

One can see how Machiavelli’s political project established the starting point for
Gramsci’s search for solutions to the problems he perceived in reformulating the Italian political
project. Through Machiavelli, Gramsci approached questions of historical and political agency;
the creation of a new political ethos and how to develop the changed consciousness that
completed this new ethos; the content of this new consciousness; the role of tactics and
strategies in setting up this new ethos; the relations between a leader and the subjects of this
new polity; and how to apply all of these aspects of the Machiavellian political epistemology to
the specific circumstances of 1920’s Italy.
And what I find fascinating in Gramsci’s approach is that it was rooted in his belief that
the mass of people, the peasantry and the proletariat, that is, the subaltern, had to be part of
developing an answer to these questions, not as subjects led to a solution, but as creators of
any solution. This belief he incorporated into his political theory and his political practice; by
assessing the faults of previous aspects of proletarian participation in Italian politics, Gramsci
eventually redefined what was the essential political problem, that of the nature of power in
Western societies.136
Gramsci sought to restore the revolutionary initiative to the masses through the
development of a conscious political agency based on a unified and coherent ideology. The
immediate question for him was what would be the form of this agency? Gramsci was critical of
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the failure of the socialists to engage the mass of workers on an intellectual level.137 Such
criticism reflected the epistemological underpinnings of Gramsci’s philosophy, his concern with
how a political knowledge could be formed that would develop the inherent agency of the
workers.138
Gramsci’s critical effort was first directed towards the restoration of the dialectic in
political practice and the interplay between the objective economic and historical conditions in
Italy and the specific subjective cultural, political and ideological conditions that the proletariat
faced.139 The result of this effort was a bifurcation in Gramsci’s political project: an internally
democratic mass party as the organic expression of the proletariat, along with a program of
political education of the workers.140
Adamson points out that the impact of the Russian Revolution was decisive for Gramsci
in settling on this bifurcated apparatus; although the Turinese workers councils had been
defeated in their attempt for power in 1920, Gramsci still insisted the Russian workers’ councils
had demonstrated that an essentially economic institution could serve as the foundation for a
reconstruction of the political process.141 Gramsci had noted how the Russian example had
grasped the preparation, seizure of power and establishment of a new order as a single unified
revolutionary process.142 To make such a process possible, Gramsci understood there needed to
be a proletarian education in which “criticism might become culture;”143 it was the workers
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changed consciousness, and the ability to critically assess their historical situation, brought
about by the workers’ councils, that would ensure that the unified revolutionary process could
take place.
This focus on the dialectical nature of education raised another critical difference
between Gramsci and previous proletarian education. He was critical of the ellipsis in Marxist
political theory between the objective economic conditions for revolution and the subjective
understanding the worker had of his historical and material situation; theory could not explain
how the proletariat gained the personality necessary to bring about revolution.144
Gramsci insisted that Marxist theory needed to be grounded in the reality the worker
had to deal with, that the theoretician needed to translate his theory into the elements of
historical life. By not adopting this dialectical approach, Marxist theory promoted a passive
political approach, which led to a failure of the proletariat to gain political agency.145 “Thus, the
general picture of human life which emerges in Gramsci's reappropriation of Marx is that of
concrete individuals actively transforming the natural world in a collective process of social
labor guided by shared practical and scientific interests.”146 Such a reappropriation allowed for
a clear-eyed approach as to the complexities facing workers in a modern Western society such
as Italy.
Gramsci envisioned a lengthy program that would develop consciousness, one that was
more suited to the intricate civil societies and superior state strength possessed by advanced
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Western nations.147 In understanding the lack of success of the proletariat in Italy, Gramsci
came to understand that the bourgeoise had developed superior elements of popular support
and that the political struggle was more complex than the reductionist tendencies espoused by
Marxist theoreticians.148 Political struggle was not a simple confrontation between antagonistic
classes but the divining of a route amongst a complex relation of forces.149
Thus, what Gramsci originally proposed as a simple political alliance between different
sectors of the subaltern, between peasants and proletariat, expanded to encompass a complete
fusion of economic, political, intellectual and moral objectives which, through the intermediary
of ideology, would establish united economic and political objectives for the allied group.150
This recognition of the role ideology played in developing consciousness, not just of the
proletariat, but also of the bourgeoisie, led Gramsci to enlarge the notion of what constitutes
the state. First, he posited the state as the site of coercion and domination, in which the
violence necessary to maintain social order and stability are institutionalized through the states’
administrative, juridical and military apparatus. Second, he saw the state as the totality of the
social, economic, political and cultural relations that form the ideological structure supporting
the political and social order, a structure that he termed civil society.151
This second notion of the state is a more positive vision than the first, and it was an
important insight that Gramsci recognized civil society as not just where ideology was
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produced, but as a site in which consent and direction were formulated.152 Ideas are developed
in civil society in order to establish the terrain on which alternative ideas operate and on which
movements opposed to the dominant political order can organize.153 “This image of a
‘regulated society’… suggests both the absence of coercion [while simultaneously promoting]
an active and productive public life.”154 The regulated society places limits on acceptable
political discourse, while making these limits appear as a natural aspect of such discourse.
Gramsci noted that the distinction between these two notions of the state were
methodological, meaning that although the two were analytically distinct, they were
intertwined in practice; any attempt to strategically realign the state would have to account for
the fact that both notions support one another.155 Fontana offers a topographical description of
Gramsci’s analysis of the state and civil society as a series of trench works, “together forming
‘permanent fortifications’ which act as buttresses or supports for the state.”156 Thus, Gramsci’s
enlargement of the state works on two levels: first, the social base of the state is enlarged
though its complex of relations in civil society and second, the functions of the state are
enlarged now that the functions of civil society are incorporated within the apparatus of the
state.157
Consequently, Gramsci’s enlarged notion of the state is not simply a site of power, nor
simply a site in which ideology is generated, but one in which ideology is generated to serve
power, in which the dual mechanism of state/civil society is utilized to create a worldview in the
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service of the interests of power. And Adamson considers it one of Gramsci’s great insights that
through his theory and practice, Gramsci was able to identify the process by which individuals
come to constitute, and possibly, reconstitute this worldview.158 Most importantly, echoing
Machiavelli, Gramsci recognized that adjusting a worldview relied on the political astuteness
and cultural awareness of the individuals engaged in this task.159
Such a recognition resolved in what one author has termed an “inversion of the relation
between civil society and political society:”160 the state can only be upended once civil society is
altered to encompass the changed worldview that would establish the basis for the new state.
Gramsci innovated on Marxist doctrine by asserting that the civil society was not the initial
moment, providing the chaotic state of nature with its warring contradictions that the state
needed to dominate, but rather, civil society provided the organization and regulation that
served as the basis for the state. Civil society embraced the whole commercial, industrial and
intellectual life of a given stage which led it to transcend the state. 161
If the state could be transformed, indeed, had to be transformed, through a
transformation of civil society, this transformation relied on the ideological practice of
intellectuals. For Gramsci, an intellectual was anyone “whose function in society was primarily
that of organizing, administering, directing, educating or leading others.”162 This broad
definition allowed for the intellectual class to include those who created the worldview of the
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dominant class, as well as those who simply passed on a worldview, or translated received
ideas to different audiences, in different contexts.
Gramsci noted the importance of the material and institutional nature of ideological
practice, how a distinct worldview was transmitted through schools, churches, the media, even
architecture.163 This ensemble of institutions, when combined with the state, with its own
multiplicity of political jurisdictions (state, federal, county, local and executive, legislative and
judicial) “establishes a dynamic relation between state and society, sometimes competitive,
sometimes collaborative, but each responding to the other, but neither able to dominate the
other.”164
The result of this dynamic process is that this worldview is articulated at various levels
of the given social formation and, rather than creating confusion or division, serves to
permeate all aspects of civil and political life. Thus, we arrive at Gramsci’s most trenchant
contribution to the political theory of power, the idea of hegemony, in which one class is able
to articulate its interests so that all classes feel their interests are represented by the dominant
ideology: hegemony is the moment of junction between the determinate objective conditions
and the actual domination of a leading group, with this junction coming about in civil society.165
Gramsci defined two methods of gaining hegemony, with the first being when a social
group articulates its own interests so as to neutralize other social groups, and the second being
when a social group articulates its interests so as to promote the full development of all the
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sectors of society.166 Gramsci, in his study of Italian political practice, realized the bourgeoisie
had used the first method, by managing to create a group of allies to accord with the pursuit of
its own interests.167
This first method, in turn, depended on a double process: the self-awareness of the
bourgeoisie as an autonomous group and the simultaneous creation of a basis of consensus.
The bourgeoisie used this consensus to create an “historical bloc,” one which could be
educated to adopt the requirements of the bourgeoisie in order to reach the goals the
bourgeoisie desired.168
What was unique about Gramsci’s articulation of hegemony and “historical bloc” was
that he saw that the bourgeoisie gained a dominant position, “not by means of monopolization
of the means of production [or] the means of violence or administration, but primarily through
a more subtle process of winning the consent of all other subaltern classes to its ideology.”
Gramsci saw that the “regulated society” applied not just to the manner in which ideas were
generated, but also to their content.
The manner in which Gramsci understood how hegemony was achieved is critical,
because he ascertained that the logic which created the hegemonic position also applied to the
creation of an alternative hegemony. An historical bloc based on a hegemonic ideology could
be disrupted by an alternative ideology, one which disarticulated the dominant ideology and
rearticulated an ideology that promoted the interests of the subaltern or the proletariat.169
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Gramsci’s grasp of how hegemony was created was instrumental in allowing him to
break away from the concept of ideology as “false consciousness” among the proletariat.
Rather than suffering under a blind assumption of bourgeoisie interests,170 Gramsci understood
how the bourgeoisie was able to universalize its direction of society to incorporate the
proletariat. “This [was] not due to ‘bad faith’… [on the part of the proletariat] but to the
uncritical ‘borrowing of conceptions’ which [bound a class] to another social group.”171
Gramsci saw how the consciousness of subordinate groups was mediated by the
dominant group, thus rendering Marxist theory ineffective.172 This consciousness revealed itself
through the material nature of ideology, that is, that the ideology adopted by the proletariat
worked to create the conditions which contributed to their further subordination.173 He also
saw how this universalization of consciousness created a conformism that applied to everyone:
“one is either mass-man or collective man.”174
Nevertheless, he also saw that the reality of proletarian existence could break through
this conformism. Consonant with his desire to bring reality to theory, he knew that the
“common sense” of the bourgeoisie could be defeated by educating the proletariat about the
“good sense” of their everyday existence.175 Such a process relied, paradoxically, on the manner
in which the “common sense” of a hegemonic worldview became universalized.
As noted earlier, civil society exists at various levels and these levels comprise a plurality
of political spaces in which a hegemonic project operates. Although hegemony is a function of
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an “intellectual bloc,” this bloc is comprised of diverse groups, who apply different arguments
in different historical, economic and cultural spaces. No one group is able to obtain supremacy
over another, thus creating the open space in which politics operates.176
It is within this multiplicity of spaces that an alternative hegemony is able to take root.
The starting point for any alternative political project is in its assessment of the relations of
forces the project must overcome to achieve its goal. This assessment looks at the material and
social conditions the subaltern faces, as historically constructed. Such an assessment allows an
individual to understand his role as an historical subject and, as Machiavelli pointed out, once
this recognition has been achieved, an individual begins to understand his role as an historical
agent, able to create an alternative to the current political situation. “It is only when the
objective conditions have been recognised [sic] that the active subject becomes free and is able
to transform reality.”177
Such an assessment of the relations of forces, Gramsci noted, should distinguish
between the “incurable contradictions” within society, that allow for a movement to challenge
the entire hegemonic system, and the “incidental movements of conjecture” which are limited
to adjustments within the power structure.178 But even with this distinction, it is important to
acknowledge how Gramsci makes the link between ideological awareness, recognition of one’s
role as an historically constituted subject, and the development of political agency. For once he
had laid out how political power is constituted, and how it could be challenged, Gramsci could
then spell out how ideological awareness could be created to bring forth this challenge.
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Gramsci made it clear (quoting Marx) that “it is in the sphere of ideology that men
become conscious of [political] conflict and fight it out.”179 For Gramsci, bourgeois domination
was an ideological and cultural fact, and it was only through the creation of a new intellectual
order, by undoing the universalization of bourgeois thought amongst the subaltern, could this
fact be overcome.180
For Gramsci, hegemony was a higher synthesis of ideology which encompassed the
linkages of awareness, historicity, and political agency detailed above, established as an
ideological unity. This higher synthesis formed the “collective will” that became the protagonist
for political action, with the ideological unity serving as the “cement” of this will.181 Such a
synthesis is analogous to Machiavelli’s new political order, in that the collective will depended
on a new form of intellectual and political leadership, with the exercise of this leadership
relying on the simultaneous development of the collective will - the subject/object dichotomy
repeated.182
Looking at leadership in this manner led Gramsci to redefine the role of the intellectual,
in fact, to redefine it in such a way as to be similar to Machiavelli’s notion of a “new prince.”
Gramsci was insistent there was no independent class of intellectuals, that an intellectual was
anyone who organized, administered, directed, educated or led others.183 The problem, as he
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saw it, was in creating intellectuals who could critique the current political system and not
simply parrot existing hegemonic discourse.
Related to this problem was one in which this new intellectual order, having the ability
to critique the political order, did so in a manner understandable to the proletariat, while also
rendering it acceptable to potential allies.184 Similar to the “new prince,” the new intellectual
had to engage in a discourse with the proletariat, while at the same time developing and
advancing this discourse, to both gain power and create the new political order that would
embody the new critique.
The creation of this new intellectual order was the first stage in the hegemonic project
Gramsci articulated, with the following three stages being: “hegemony as a political project; the
realization of this hegemonic project in the concrete institutions and organizational forms of a
'hegemonic apparatus'; and fourth, ultimately and decisively, the social and political hegemony
of the workers' movement.”185 And for hegemony to succeed as a political project, it was
necessary to do more than create an alternative worldview; one needed to break down the
principles of the common worldview of the dominant group.
This common worldview does not exist in a simplistic fashion, but is instead comprised
of a complex ensemble of elements “whose contents can never be determined in advance since
it depends on a whole series of historical and national factors and also on the relations of forces
existing at a particular moment.”186 This ensemble of elements Gramsci assembled under the
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term of “common sense,” and it is “common sense,” that Adamson notes, which “represents
the place from which any genuine [proletarian] education must depart.”187
“Common sense,” as with other ideologies, has its roots in “true” elements of societal
and cultural practice, but its relation to the truth is subordinate to its function “as the cultural
cement smoothing relations between state and civil society.”188 Intrinsic to the definition of
“common sense” is its contrast with “good sense,” that is, to thought that satisfies the real
needs and interests of the masses of ordinary people who hold it.189 Nevertheless, because
“common sense” is comprised of many elements, it is an ideology which maintains a stratified
character, and is thus able to incorporate any philosophical challenges to it as new
sedimentations within a shifting corpus, rather than be exposed and overcome by these
challenges – “the complexity of common sense is matched only by its seeming intractability.”190
This battle of “good sense” against “common sense” highlights the asymmetric power
struggle between the subaltern and the dominant society. Fontana applies a geographical
analogy to this struggle, with the “North” representing coherence and hegemonic supremacy
over the “South,” which represents fragmentation and incoherence. Whereas the “common
sense” of the North is easily accessible, the divisions within the worldview of the South allow
for it to be easily dominated.191 Thus, it becomes incumbent for the subaltern to subjectively
realize the objective conditions which serve as the basis of power of the “North.” The attack on
“common sense” grows out of the recognition and articulation of those elements of the
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dominant ideology that cannot stand the scrutiny of “good sense” and which serve as the basis
for a unified ideology of the subaltern.192
Again, one can see how the subject/object dichotomy, initially posited by Machiavelli,
plays out in the subaltern establishing a new political order. This new political order depends on
the subaltern forming a “collective will,” which relies on the development of “good sense” to
combat “common sense,” which turns on a subjective recognition of the factors occluded by
“common sense.” This recognition develops the subaltern’s understanding of his historical
condition, which serves to create the political agency needed to create a “collective will.” Not a
circular development, Gramsci’s formulation should be seen as one of overlapping elements,
each reinforcing another, with a worked-out ideology, that is constantly being modified and
adjusted, serving as its core. The new political order requires the former subaltern to grow
ideologically, and then to respond to this new growth, not in a linear fashion, but in a dialectical
one.
Such a viewpoint reveals again why Gramsci was critical of Italian Marxist doctrine after
the rise of fascism. The appeal of “direct action” to the masses, assumed the existence of
revolutionary agency in society without any political organization. Alternatively, the divide
between the Socialist party, the intellectuals and the masses, pointed out a failure of political
leadership to establish the revolutionary hegemony needed to overtake the dominant bloc.193
Both criticisms, from two different standpoints, reflected the same problem: “who, or what
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entity, is the agent that, through its practice and active engagement in the world… resolves the
contradiction between thought and action, ethics and politics, ‘culture’ and people.”194
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony involved the creation and development of an actor
who, working within the existing sociopolitical order, possesses the ability to transcend that
order, and does transcend it, by embodying the new order, and making it concrete in the
world.195 And for Gramsci, the only way in which this new actor could develop was for Marxism
to engage with what people actually thought, to bring practice to theory, to bring critical
awareness to “common sense.”196 Gramsci insisted that elements of “good sense” were already
present within people’s “common sense,” that this “good sense” could leverage the
consciousness of people who were already aware of the truth of their existence.197
The problem, as Gramsci saw it, was to develop the institutions that would allow the
worker to develop this autonomous awareness of his existence, to develop his agency. He
sought to address the question of how does one create a culture of critical awareness, not just
within individuals, or within a cadre of intellectuals, but within the mass of people?198 Such a
movement, he realized, could only be accomplished if the intellectual leadership of the
subaltern served a directing function before the actual revolutionary moment. This group “must
already become 'directing' before the conquest of power (this is itself one of the principal
conditions of the conquest of power),” exercising de facto leadership in order to reach a

194

Fontana, Hegemony, 152
Fontana, Hegemony, 5
196
Forgacs, The Gramsci Reader, 323
197
Forgacs, The Gramsci Reader, 323
198
Forgacs, The Gramsci Reader, 328
195

46

hegemonic position. This leadership would conduct itself in a dialectical fashion, leading the
subaltern, but also being directed by it.199
Such a process Gramsci articulated, in a fundamentally new theory of revolution, as the
“war of position.”200 This concept envisioned an extended campaign for ideological hegemonic
influence,201 with (extending the military analogy) “a series of moral and intellectual battles
whose goal is the construction of a given social and political reality.”202 In the revolutionary
struggle, the “war of position” is the decisive moment.203
But as one author has pointed, the “war of position,” while being decisive, can be
divided into two stages, with the intellectual battle being only the first stage, a “passive
revolution.”204 It would be still be necessary to take this “long prepared force… into the field
when it is judged that a situation is favourable [sic].”205 The mass of people needed to be
developed and rendered “homogenous, compact and self-aware,” and then placed into action
when a subjective analysis of the relations of force deemed it propitious.206
This move into collective organized action allowed the subaltern to identify and
confront specific targets. Through such action, the various parts of his world become concrete
and he would come to an understanding of his own position in relation to the rest of the world,
that is, he would gain a specific class consciousness, based on ideological unity.207
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Gramsci described this moment of understanding as a moment of catharsis “which
alleviates primordially understood doubts, fears, and contradictions” of the subaltern.208 Such a
moment is important in Gramsci’s revolutionary theory, because in it he definitively moves
away from the Marxist notion of theory being actualized in the world through a deterministic
process, and instead puts forward a theory that relies on conscious action, in which theory and
practice are actualized in a determined historical context.209
Thus, Gramsci’s theory can be seen as a reconceptualization of Marxism in that the
realization by the subaltern of his historical economic condition is only a phase that needs to
evolve and be elaborated on in a “philosophy of praxis” that actualizes this realization.210 His
theory broadens the understanding of Marx by subordinating the relations of production to
man; history “becomes a process of structuralization of human knowledge based on the
organized will of man.”211
His theory can also be seen as echoing Machiavelli’s insertion of the mass into history,
that once man is placed between the problem and the solution, he will create a solution that
transcends the facts from which the problem arose. This solution manifests itself as a moral and
philosophical act that develops an “ought to be” rooted in a material and concrete “is.”212 And
this solution can only be reached through a dialectical exchange between the leaders of a
political movement and those who participate in it.213
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Gramsci’s belief in a dialectical exchange was not simply a tactic to facilitate
revolutionary change; rather, he felt it imperative that the intellectual and moral direction of a
revolutionary movement should come from an active exchange of elements between the
intellectual leadership and the members of the movement. This was the only way to create a
unified ideological system that would break down hegemonic thought while also articulating
the interests of the subaltern;214 this was the only way for a revolutionary movement to
unearth the source of the problems it set out to discover.215
Such a process would evolve dialectically, by breaking down the basic elements of the
current system, and then rearticulating the changed elements into a new system that would
express the new situation.216 Gramsci criticized Italian socialists by not adopting such a
procedural model, by conceiving of politics “as something nourished on air, which develops in
itself and by itself.”217 For Gramsci, any socialist party had to be based on an organic
relationship with the class it represented, through “spontaneity and conscious direction.”218
Consequently, for Gramsci, the political thought of the party, or any intellectual
leadership, is the thought of the popular masses; it is a knowledge that acquires its character by
addressing itself to the masses and, concurrently, the masses acquire their moral and
intellectual understanding as they become the embodiment of this knowledge.219 Once again,
we see Machiavelli’s influence on Gramsci, with the party becoming the “new prince” and the
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masses becoming part of a new political ethos which they helped to create, with this ethos
based on their needs.
This new ethos would still need conscious direction in order to become actual; the
subaltern has a generalized propensity toward spontaneous, reactive and unpredictable
actions.220 There is still needed a wedding of knowledge to power that would analyze the
subjective conditions for revolutionary action. Gramsci offered that socio-political
circumstances do not themselves produce political change, they only set the conditions in
which such change becomes possible. Some of those conditions were:
“the relations of force obtaining at the political level, the degree of political organization
and combativity of the opposing forces, the strength of the political alliances which they
manage to bind together and their level of political consciousness, [and] preparation of the
struggle on the ideological terrain.”221
Fontana extends his geographical analogy of the relations of force, adding to the
imbalances present in the North/South dyad, an East/West dichotomy, with the East
representing political society as the state of coercion, and the West representing civil society as
the state of consent, with each existing in a constant and reciprocal tension with one another,
with both acquiring meaning only in relation to each other.222 Thus, the creation of any
hegemonic project is not static but a continuous process of creation, unevenly developed and
expressed.223
Such an insight is important because it points out that even in a “complete revolution one that brings to power a coherent class formation united behind a single economic, political,
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and cultural conception of the world,”224 there is still an ongoing process of change, exchange
and reformulation. What is most important in the revolutionary process envisioned by Gramsci
is that the mass of people have become the hegemonic force that exercises leadership. What is
key is that the masses have reached “the self-consciousness of being in an active and purposive
engagement with society and with history, an engagement that is both the product of such
consciousness and the ground that gives rise to it.”225 The mass of people have come to
constitute the new political ethos.
In summary, Gramsci’s thinking provides sufficient context in which to understand the
political dimensions of the reform campaigns. His theory outlines the nature of power, how the
state is a site of both coercion and consent, and how it consists of both the formal state and
civil society. He provides an understanding of how the state is transformed through civil society,
of how intellectuals develop a worldview through civil society that then forms a hegemonic bloc
by which one class is able to dominate all others.
Gramsci notes how this hegemony is formed by consent, how the subaltern adopts the
dominant worldview, not through false consciousness, but through conformism with other
sectors of society, through the adoption of “common sense.” He then points out how this
hegemony can be challenged, by developing political agency in the subaltern, by restoring the
dialectic between what society ought to be for the subaltern and what it is. This dialectic is
rooted in the reality of the subaltern’s existence, and in recognizing this reality, the subaltern
begins to understand the nature of power and of his historical situation. This realization forms
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the political agency necessary to create the “what is” from the “what ought to be;” this
realization helps the subaltern to develop a criticism of culture to engage with the world.
Gramsci also spelled out the process by which this ideological awareness takes place. It
is necessary for an intellectual leadership to promote a dialectical discourse with the subaltern,
a discourse in which the leadership is learning as much as they are teaching about objective
conditions. This discourse is able to break down the “common sense” of the dominant class and
replace it with the “good sense” of those elements that improve the subaltern’s existence. This
discourse eventually forms an alternative hegemony, an ideological bloc, that engages in a “war
of position.” This “war of position” is the necessary step to facilitate the seizure of power; it is
the conquering of the dominant hegemony of civil society, without which the ultimate ascent to
power is not possible.
The intellectual leadership directs this new hegemony toward specific targets to be
overthrown, with this movement into a phase of action creating a “cathartic” moment for the
subaltern, in which he realizes the extent of his power and claims a full sense of political
agency. This moment of catharsis is then expanded upon, under conscious direction of the
leadership, into a continuous process of creating a new society, but this direction is no longer
driven by an intellectual elite, but is the people expressing themselves politically.
Given this broad understanding of the way in power is constituted, alternatives to
hegemony are created, and the role of ideology in both, it remains to be seen how the specifics
of the reform campaigns fit within this understanding.
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V. Optimism of the Intellect, Pessimism of the Will

As I stated earlier, I regard both of the police reform campaigns as failures and thus, it
becomes necessary to explain why they failed. Many reasons can be given for the campaigns
lack of success, but the primary reason, in my opinion, is they lacked an accurate conception of
themselves and of the mass of people for whom they claimed to be speaking, and of how both
related to political power, with this misconception creating an inaccurate assessment of their
opponents and of how power is constituted.
There could potentially be any number of approaches to assessing why these failures
mattered in not achieving the campaigns’ goals, but I have adopted a Gramscian analytic,
rooted in Machiavellian political theory, to engage with the subject matter. Gramsci’s
discussions of how power is constructed, how political agency is created, and the role of
ideology in both, provides not only the proper context to understand the campaigns’ tactics and
strategies, I feel, but allows one to understand why their failure to address each of these
aspects of political theory resulted in failed campaigns.
Ultimately, Gramsci’s thought is an appropriate basis for analyzing these campaigns
because his thinking is based in historicism, that is, in an assessment of human activity
becoming conscious of itself, and of the manner in which the organized will of humans
structures knowledge. This historicism is not necessarily a Marxist approach, but:
“a critique of all ideologies, which relates ideas, beliefs, and values to
their respective social frameworks; a theory… which seeks to alter or transform
existing social structures by focusing on their limitations and revealing new
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possibilities; [and] an ideological tool allowing men to actualize such new
possibilities through the organization and politicization of subaltern classes.”226
Gramsci’s historicism requires an objective understanding of the historical conditions
creating your current circumstance and the belief that you can change them; neither campaign
sought to develop either this understanding or such belief. Thus, both campaigns were
handicapped from the start in developing the proper approach to reach their goals.
Specifically, I am asserting five reasons why the campaigns were not successful, all
stemming from their initial misconception. First, they never understood their task as obtaining
power for the mass of citizens who lacked it in regard to the police. Second, this lack of
understanding led to a failure to develop the mass of people who could develop this new
relationship to the police, who could embody a different political ethos, and put it into practice
in the concreate reality of bail reform and police discipline. Third, this failure was mainly due to
the leaders of the campaigns not engaging in a dialectical relationship with the people for
whom they claimed to be speaking, to incorporate the reality of people’s situation into the
theory of the campaigns’ talking points and strategy. This lack of engagement led to the fourth
reason, that the reform campaigns never created an adequate ideological basis for their
arguments, were never able to make use of the mass of people’s “good sense” to combat the
hegemony of “common sense.” Fifth, the campaigns inaccurately assessed the state as being
the legislature, without accommodating the role of police departments, district attorneys in
dominating civil society discourse and the discourse around their two campaigns. Finally, I
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conclude that all of these failures, instead of advancing the cause of police reform, only served
to hinder it.
First, both campaigns viewed their goal as making the system of policing fairer – bail
reform by not jailing arrested persons before trial, repeal of Section 50-a by informing victims
of police misconduct of any officer discipline – but neither goal was understood as altering a
fundamental relationship between citizens and the police.
In fact, bail reform sought to alter the status of arrested persons as criminals from
whom society needed to be protected, to citizens who maintained all of their rights and
privileges until a final determination of their criminal case. Such an alteration interpolated a
certain social contract between the role of the police as executors of the power of arrest and
their role as determinate assessors of right and wrong behavior. The repeal of Section 50-a, on
the other hand, sought to alter police discipline from something that solely concerned the
police department to a matter that was of public concern. Taken to its logical conclusion, repeal
of Section 50-a sought to enact the fundamental principle that the police are ultimately
accountable to the people they are sworn to serve, with such an enactment upturning the
current ethos and culture of policing.
Viewing the reform campaigns goals in this, more honest and accurate, manner, makes
it clear that the people for whom the campaigns claimed to speak were not simple reformers,
but people who lacked power and who were seeking to gain greater power and control over
their lives. Because the campaigns did not have this clear-eyed view of the goals of their
campaigns, they never advanced to the proper political understanding of what was necessary to
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reach their goals; they never sought “to alter or transform [the] existing social structures by
focusing on their limitations and revealing new possibilities.”
Because the campaigns never viewed their mission as obtaining power for the mass of
people, this led to a second failure, as identified by Gramscian theory. Both campaigns did not
participate in a process of creating citizens who could develop and utilize this power, who
would embody this altered relationship with the police; the campaigns never engaged in the
subject/object dichotomy that Machiavelli identified as being necessary to create a new
political ethos. Such a process necessitated first making people aware of the conditions of their
historical situation, that is, of how the system of bail curtailed their rights as citizens and how
the system of discipline transparency impeded any police accountability to citizens. The second
step would have been to develop the “what ought to be” out of the current “what is,” to utilize
the knowledge of the current historical situation to create an alternative that would satisfy
people’s needs and that would meet this new understanding of their relation to the police.
Finally, this awareness of “what ought to be” would work to create the citizens who could
embody this new relationship, who are empowered by the movement from the ideal “what
ought to be” to the change in the concrete reality of their daily relationship with the police.
For instance, the bail reform campaign should have required that the program, created
to ensure that persons released before trial would appear for their scheduled appearance, was
in place by the effective date of the bail reform legislation, January 1, 2020.227 Such a
requirement could have helped the persons released under bail reform who needed assistance.
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More importantly, however, the data on persons released under bail reform could have been
used to convince, not the opponents of bail reform, but the persons released under bail reform,
of their worth as citizens. The data could have been used as real-time indicia of the merits of
the bail reform arguments: numbers of appearances kept, jobs not lost, families kept intact, all
could have been used to create a sense of community of persons released, citizens disproving
bail reform’s opponents, rather than remaining a collection of disaggregated individuals.
Such a strategic development, however, would have supposed a dialectical relationship
between the organizations comprising the campaigns and the people for whom they claimed to
be speaking, a relationship that did not exist, thus providing a third reason for failure. The
leaders of the reform campaigns acted as an intellectual elite, deciding on the tactics, goals and
strategies for the campaigns. Gramsci envisioned an intellectual elite, and Machiavelli a “new
prince,” as one which would develop a discourse with the people that would form the new
political ethos, make sure this ethos reflected the reality of the mass of the people, while
developing the political capabilities of the people who would embody this new ethos. This elite,
in turn, would be transformed by this dialectical relationship, so that it would be the people’s
representatives, in as much as it reflected the ethos of the mass of people created by this
dialectical relationship.
For example, after the passage of the initial bail reform legislation, the reform campaign
had nine months to develop a relationship with the persons who would benefit from the
reform, as well as with citizens in general. Such a dialectical relationship not only could have
created a mass of people who understood and embraced reform, but also could have informed
the leaders of the campaigns of the real issues involved in reform. Instead, after allowing the
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opponents of bail reform to gain the initiative after bail reform was passed, it engaged in a $2
million media campaign to counteract the disinformation of their opponents, a campaign that
turned out to be wholly unsuccessful.
In addition, a discussion with victims of police misconduct would have revealed that,
because the NYPD has complete control over its disciplinary system, it is able to characterize
egregious crimes as “minor rules violations,” which, under the repeal legislation, does not have
to be disclosed. As an example, published reports noted that a detective, who was accused of
sexually assaulting a confidential informant and extorting sexual favors from her, was punished
only with the loss of 40 vacation days, raising the question of why such a small penalty was
appropriate for such heinous accusations? The answer was because the detective was charged
only with the “minor rules violations” of “violating confidential informant procedures [and]
failing to document investigative actions.”228 Thus, neither the alleged victim nor the public is
permitted to be informed of the detective’s penalty under the repeal Section 50-a bill passed by
the legislature (although the outcome was eventually leaked to the press). The reform
campaign could have avoided such an outcome if it had truly understood and been engaged
with the reality of persons who have suffered from police misconduct.
Instead, both campaigns made use of individual instances of terrible miscarriages of
justice to make their points, rather than engaging with individuals as people who mattered. For
example, the repeal Section 50-a campaign relied on the secrecy surrounding the Eric Garner
discipline case to make its case. Meanwhile, the bail reform campaign relied on the example of
Kalief Browder, who, because he could not afford $3,000 bail, spent three years in jail (with a
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year and a half of that time spent in solitary confinement), with the criminal charges eventually
being dismissed without a trial.229 Both examples were deployed as props, to make a point,
instead as two of the many individuals with whom the campaign needed to engage.
Both campaigns failed to leverage the consciousness of the mass of people to develop
their “good sense” in contrast to the “common sense” that bail reform and section 50-a repeal
would lead to more crime and less respect for the police. This reflected the campaigns’ fourth
failure, according to Gramsci, a failure to develop an ideological basis for their campaigns. For
instance, the bail reform campaign failed to develop the “good sense” of people’s awareness
that almost all persons arrested for a crime do not commit another crime after being released
without bail,230 to contrast with the “common sense” fear of crime.
The campaign did not appreciate the intractability of “common sense” and never
accounted for the manner in which popular beliefs concerning crime have material force, and
how these beliefs could turn against them. The campaign refused to acknowledge Gramsci’s
point of how ideology is formed and adopted through a universalization of consciousness, even
though poll results showed that as the arguments around bail reform persisted, the idea
became less and less attractive in the public’s mind.231
The campaigns needed to create a higher synthesis of ideology, based on the
recognition of “good sense” to combat the hegemony of “common sense.” Thus, for example,
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the bail reform campaign should have translated the reality of people’s experiences with the
bail system into a broader understanding of people’s role within the criminal justice system and
how it impinges on their lives. Similarly, the repeal Section 50-a campaign should have
expanded on the realization that police are accountable to the citizenry to a broader awareness
of the role the police and policing play in shaping our lives. It is this ideological basis that
provides the “cathartic” moment, in which success in the specific campaign for bail reform or
discipline transparency, combined with an ideological understanding of the historical situation,
creates the “collective will” by which the subaltern, those without power, begins to understand
its true capabilities for revolutionary change.
It is this ideological understanding that begins the process of a “war of position,” by
which an ideological “historical bloc” is formed. The reform campaigns mistakenly took the
“Blue Wave” election of 2018 and the George Floyd protests as proof of an ideological sea
change needed to secure their reforms, without noticing that both moments were ideologically
contentless. Both reform campaigns never bothered to developethe core of supporters who
embodied a specific political ethos, that could have used this ethos to apply virtu to control
fortuna, to shape events following the 2018 election and the Floyd protests, respectively.
All of these shortcomings, perhaps, pale in regard to the campaigns’ final failure, that of
not accommodating the manner in which state and civil society are intertwined. The campaigns
viewed the state as extending only so far as the legislature. They sought to influence the
legislature only, failing to recognize the manner in which police departments, police unions and
district attorneys wield power, and how all of these actors were able to dominate the discourse
in civil society of both campaigns and how this discourse might affect the legislature. “We might
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be seeing the limitations of a legislative approach, especially when it’s coming up against this
coordination between police, police unions, prosecutors, and conservative politics,”232 noted
one member of the reform campaign, in something of a post-mortem to the campaign after the
“reform to the bail reform” had passed the legislature.
The repeal of Section 50-a campaign, for example, did not account for the way in which
the dominant discourse of civil society is able to incorporate new philosophical challenges “as
new sedimentations within a shifting corpus.” The characterization of disciplinary transparency
as an issue of public trust allowed the NYPD to create the perception it was responding to the
need for transparency, while keeping discipline completely in the dark.
Similarly, the bail reform campaign didn’t address the manner in which force and
consent are intertwined in the creation of hegemonic discourse. The campaign opponents, in
the form of police departments and district attorneys, argued that only they truly knew how
the criminal justice system worked.233 Thus, the opponents of bail reform could lay claim to a
superior knowledge as to the debate’s subject matter because of their existent authority to
decide such matters in reality, not as a debating point. That is to say, they had the force of the
state behind their discourse. The bail reform campaign again was unwilling to engage with the
degree of force inherent in their opponents’ arguments, focusing all of their energy on the
legislative strategy.
Some would argue that, despite the failures that I have enumerated, the cause of police
reform, nevertheless, has advanced; I would disagree, for three reasons. First, three times in
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the last eight years, the CPR coalition, for example, has conducted reform campaigns that they
claim have advanced the cause police accountability. And yet, after each campaign, as with the
repeal Section 50-a campaign, the coalition has asserted the NYPD has thwarted its attempts to
make the department more accountable.
Just last month, for instance, it was revealed how the NYPD’s Inspector General, an
office created as a result of a CPR campaign, had been rendered ineffective because of lack of
cooperation from the NYPD.234 Such an outcome is to be expected, I would say, because this
particular “reform” did nothing to alter the power dynamic between the police and everyone
else. Yes, it’s true, that police have the authority to enforce the law and to control order, but it
is only the authority that we give to them, and we always maintain the power to establish the
parameters of that authority. None of the reforms posited by CPR addressed this underlying
issue, and until this issue is confronted, we will continue to engage in shadow-plays with the
NYPD, in which they pretend to sublimate themselves to our authority in the foreground, with
the truth of the situation being expressed in the background.
Second, no real change has come about in the objective conditions in which any police
reform could possibly occur. Last August, after the George Floyd protests, a Gallup poll showed,
for the first time, that less than half of all Americans had confidence in the police, with white
Americans polling at 56% and black Americans at 19%.235 This past March, however, the
confidence level of whites in the police had risen by 12 percentage points; amongst blacks it
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had arisen by 14 points.236 More pertinently, perhaps, a national sample of white Americans
showed that, rather than acknowledge or deal with racism in a systemic or social manner, most
preferred to deal with racism in limited and private ways, such as listening to people of color.237
All of which is to say that I don’t feel as if the events of the last year revealed the “incurable
contradictions” within society, but rather that they represented the “incidental movements of
conjecture” which are limited to reforms that don’t disturb the power structure.
Finally, there is no reason to think the organizations involved in the reform campaigns
have learned any lessons or reassessed its tactics: CPR has conducted three campaigns, NYUJ
two (counting bail reform and the “reform to the reform” as two) and they have conducted
each one in the same manner: establishing talking points, media strategies, lobbying legislators,
using individuals as props for their pre-determined strategies, that fail to take into account the
facts on the ground, the dynamic relation between the problem, the solution, the actor and the
subject.
In my opinion, such obtuseness is due to the raison d’etre of the non-governmental
organizations that dominate New York’s police reform efforts. CPR was formed with the
intention of: “substantially decreasing bias-based encounters with the police; increasing the
ability of the most affected communities to hold the police accountable and prevent abusive
policing; and building the political will among the public and policymakers to advance a more
just and humane policing paradigm in New York City.”238 NYUJ was started with the intent “to
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advance reforms to fix New York City’s broken criminal justice system that unfairly targets
lower income communities and communities of color.”239
All of these goals sound admirable, if open-ended. They establish the basis for the
campaigns’ operations: rallies, press releases, media campaigns, lobbying, legislation are all
activities that can be quantified, measured, documented, accounted for, when seeking funds.
None of the goals depend on proof they are transforming actual people’s lives, the ones’
undergoing the “unfair targeting” and the “inhumane policing.” These reform campaigns
generate results that can be held up as achievements, but that don’t make a difference in the
reality in which police officers interact with citizens.
What is needed is a long-range process that builds on concrete successes that change
the manner in which the police operate, rooted in the principle that they are accountable to us,
the people whom they are sworn to serve. For instance, the repeal Section 50-a campaign
never should have been allowed to go forward without first gaining a detailed understanding of
how the NYPD’s system of discipline functioned. The ultimate goal of the campaign should not
have been to make police discipline transparent: that should have been the short-range goal,
with the long-range being to make officers accountable to the people, to alter the power
dynamic between the people and the NYPD.
This short-range goal could only be understood in the context of the final goal, thus,
avoiding the circumstance in which the NYPD was allowed to assert what transparency looked
like. The achievement of transparency would then lead to the next step: once the complete
scope of discipline became clear to the public, we could begin to shape the discipline system in
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a manner that reflected the needs of the people, as opposed to the administrative and
bureaucratic whims of the NYPD. Consequently, we would no longer have the situation in which
an officer who failed to coordinate his precinct’s response to an officer shooting240 is disciplined
with the same amount of punishment as an officer who sexually assaulted an underage
prostitute.241
Thus, we could begin the process by which the citizenry begins to assert its authority
over the NYPD; we would reach that “cathartic” moment in which ideology is implanted in a
concrete reality, thus creating the “collective will” by which the people begin to understand
their ability to control history, instead of always being subject to it. Unfortunately, we are stuck
with a process that privileges pre-determined tactics, strategies and goals and that doesn’t
recognize the role people can play, must play, in transforming their lives. It is a process that
reverses Gramsci’s dictum of “pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will,” to “optimism of
the intellect, pessimism of the will.”
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